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REFORMING THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL
BARRY SULLIVAN*

In 2001, I rejoined my law firm after spending seven years as a law teacher
and administrator and was soon asked to consult on a litigated matter involving
a corporate client. I reviewed the relevant materials and met with the litigation
team. I told them that I did not find one of their arguments to be persuasive and
that I did not think that a judge would be persuaded either. I suggested an
alternative line of argument that seemed more promising to me. After the
meeting, a young lawyer who exuded self-confidence took me aside. He
thought I should know that the world of law practice had changed during the
years I was away, that the theory I found unpersuasive had been developed by
in-house counsel, and that our job, in this new world of law practice, was just
to make the arguments we were told to make. Quoting Marshall Field, the
young lawyer pronounced that our job was to "give the lady what she wants."I

*
Cooney & Conway Chair in Advocacy and George Anastaplo Professor of Constitutional
Law and History, Loyola University Chicago. The author is grateful to Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Dianne
Avery, Christine Kexel Chabot, John C. Dehn, Ramon Feldbrin, Michael J. Kaufman, Alfred S.
Konefsky, Jacob Morse, Alan Raphael, Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, and Spencer Weber Waller for
comments on an earlier draft, and to Kynat Akram and Savannah Theil for excellent research
assistance. The author would also like to thank the other participants in this symposium for many
stimulating discussions, as well as the editors and staff of the Notre Dame Journalof Law, Ethics,
and Public Policy, both for organizing the symposium and for their excellent editorial assistance.
Finally, the author is grateful to the Cooney & Conway Chair Fund and the Loyola Faculty Research

Fund for financial support. The usual stipulation applies.

1.

See LLOYD WENDT & HERMAN KOGAN, GIVE THE LADY WHAT SHE WANTS! THE STORY

OF MARSHALL FIELD & COMPANY 223 (1952). Anthony Trollope describes a male character's view
of lawyering in similar terms: "Bold ... merely wanted a man who knew the forms of law, and who
would do what he was told for his money. He had no idea of putting himself in the hands of a lawyer.
He wanted law from a lawyer as he did a coat from a tailor, because he could not make it so well
himself" ANTHONY TROLLOPE, THE WARDEN 20 (Everyman's Library ed. 1855). The sexism of
Marshall Field's remark would be amplified by later generations of marketers. See LIZABETH
COHEN, A CONSUMERS' REPUBLIC: THE POLITICS OF MASS CONSUMPTION IN POSTWAR AMERICA
314 (2003) ("Behavioral differences between the sexes had origins, they argued, that extended
beyond the social and cultural to the psychological and even physiological. In 1958, for example,
Janet Wolff claimed . . . that women were marked as shoppers by their biology-reproductive
systems and sexual characteristics, size and muscular power, proportions and acute sensesmediated by distinctive personality traits like intuition, compassion, loyalty, and
irrationality . . .. While marketers subjected female customers to this kind of psychological
analysis, often aimed at their insecurities, they credited men as a market segment with authority and
financial resources but spared them the same mental probing.").
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I doubt that his perspective was shared by most of my colleagues, but it was a
viewpoint that clearly had traction for some, even if few would have presented
it so baldly.2
I recalled that conversation recently when I read about the oral argument
in Kareem v. Haspel.3 In Kareem, a United States citizen who works as a
journalist in Syria, brought suit in federal court to ascertain whether the
government had targeted him for summary execution under an Obama-era
Presidential Policy Guidance.4 The government's argument on appeal did not
address the merits. Instead, the government argued that Kareem lacked standing
to sue, and that his claims were barred in any event by the political question
doctrine and the state secrets privilege.5 The court of appeals ultimately ruled
that the plaintiff lacked standing, and that the government's other grounds for
dismissal need not be reached, because Kareem's "complaint fail[ed] to allege
plausibly that any of the five aerial bombings were attributable to the United
States and specifically targeted [him]."6 At oral argument, however, at least one
judge expressed incredulity at the government's argument that its
determinations were not reviewable: "Judge Patricia Millett characterized the
DOJ's argument as giving the government the ability to 'unilaterally decide to

2. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 2.1 (AM. BAR. ASS'N 2002). If the argument had
been frivolous (which it was not), that would have raised a different issue for the litigation team.
See id. at r. 3.1. See also Barry Sullivan, Professions of Law, 9 GEORGETOWN J. LEG. ETHICS 1235,

1251-52 (1996) ("A professional, [Saul] Linowitz asserts, does not simply do a client's bidding or
execute a client's orders ... . A lawyer chooses clients and has a duty to provide . . those chosen
with the fruits of judgment, which may well be something very different from what they wish to
hear.").

3.

See Kareem v. Haspel, 986 F.3d 859 (D.C. Cir. 2021).

4. See PROCEDURES FOR APPROVING DIRECT ACTION AGAINST TERRORIST TARGETS
LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES AND AREAS OF ACTIVE HOSTILITIES (May 22, 2013),
https://www.justice.gov/oip/foia-library/procedures for approvingdirect action against terroris
t_targets/download. The 2013 Policy Guidance was originally classified "Top Secret," but was
finally made public, pursuant to a court order, in 2016; it was based on a 2010 Office of Legal

Counsel opinion. See Karen DeYoung, Newly Declassified Document Sheds Light on How
President Approves Drone Strikes, WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/world/national-security/newly-declassified-document-sheds-light-on-how-president-approves-

drone-strikes/2016/08/06/f424fe50-5be0-l

Ie6-831d-0324760ca856_story.html

("The document's

dry, bureaucratic language seems in stark contrast to the presumably dire consequences of the
actions it outlines, and it leaves a number of questions unanswered. What appears to be a description
of information to be included in the profile of an individual target is blacked out."). An earlier
version of the 2010 OLC memorandum was prepared in late 2009. See Charlie Savage, Court
Releases Large Parts of Memo Approving Killing of American in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES (June 23,
2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/24/us/justice-department-found-it-lawful-to-target-

anwar-al-awlaki.html.
5. See Kareem v. Haspel, 412 F. Supp. 3d 52, 55 (D.D.C. 2019). The court of appeals vacated
the district court's order dismissing the complaint on the government's state secrets defense and
remanded for entry of an order of dismissal based on Kareem's failure to establish his standing to
sue.

6. Kareem v. Haspel, 986 F.3d at 861.
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kill U.S. citizens,' according to coverage of the argument by Courthouse News
Service. 'Do you appreciate how extraordinary that proposition is?" 7 Judge
Millett was apparently persuaded that the plaintiff lacked standing, and she did
not dissent from the panel decision.
If the government's assertion of non-reviewability seemed new to Judge
Millett, the underlying, substantive policy was not. The Presidential Policy
Guidance that the plaintiff alleged to be involved in Kareem was based on a
classified memorandum, which was prepared in 2010 by the Office of Legal
Counsel ("OLC"), the division of the Justice Department tasked with giving
legal advice to the executive branch.8 The memorandum endorsed the
President's authority to order the targeted killing of U.S. citizens believed to be
terrorists. 9 Neither the legality nor the wisdom of that policy was initially
opened to debate outside the executive branch.1 0 Like much of OLC's work
product, the memorandum was not intended for public consumption, and its

7.

See Debra Cassens Weiss, US Can Kill Its Own Citizens Without Review When State

Secrets Are

Involved,

DOJ Lawyer Argues,

ABA J.

(Nov.

18,

2020

2:09

PM),

https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/doj-lawyer-argues-us-can-kill-its-own-citizens-withoutreview-when-state-secrets-are-involved. Kareem's lawyer argued that, "[w]hether that's in a
parking lot in the United States or abroad in Syria, the government has claimed-for the first time
ever in this case-that it has unfettered and unreviewable discretion to kill US citizens at will." Id.
8. See 28 U.S.C. § 510 (authorizing the Attorney General to delegate his statutory authority
to other Justice Department personnel); 28 C.F.R. § 0.25 (1988) (setting forth the duties of the

Office of Legal Counsel).
9. See Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., Off. of Legal
Couns., to the Att'y Gen. Regarding the Applicability of Fed. Crim. Ls. and the Const. to

16,
2010)
(July
Shaykh al-Aulaqi
Operations
Against
Lethal
Contemplated
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/pages/attachments/2015/04/02/2010-07-16__olc_aagabarron_-_al-aulai.pdf. See also MAUREEN DUFFY, DETENTION OF TERRORISM
SUSPECTS: POLITICAL DISCOURSE AND FRAGMENTED PRACTICES 151-54 (2018) (discussing the
Al-Aulaqi case). For a thoughtful defense of the government's policy (but not its reasoning), see H.
JEFFERSON POWELL, TARGETING AMERICANS: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE U.S. DRONE WAR

145-46 (2016) ("[T]he Obama administration turned to an antiseptic language about a 'balancing
of interests' that lacks even the basic candor without which law becomes a meaningless charade:
The administration was not trying to respect or take into account al-Awlaki's interests but to destroy
them. The killing was constitutional, and it may have been wise, but we should not pretend that it
was something it was not."). President Obama gave a full-throated defense of the policy at the
University of Chicago Law School in April 2016. See President Obama's Response to the Use of
Drones: Clip of President Obama Town Hall Meeting on the Supreme Court, C-SPAN (Apr. 7,
In 2017, President
2016), https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4587864/user-clip-drone-response.
Trump apparently altered the Obama policy to make it easier for government personnel to launch
drone attacks. See Charlie Savage, Trump's Secret Rules for Drone Strikes Outside War Zones Are

Disclosed, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/01/us/politics/trumpdrone-strike-rules.html?searchResultPosition=8.

10. Although the document was classified, the government's actions pursuant to the
document soon became the subject of scholarly and professional debate. See Ryan Alford et al.,
Targeted Killing and the Rule of Law, CATO UNBOUND (June 2011), https://www.catounbound.org/issues/june-2011/targeted-killing-rule-law; John C. Dehn & Kevin Jon Heller,
TargetedKilling: The Case ofAnwarAl-Aulaqi, 159 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 175 (2011).
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conclusions were not likely to be tested in court.'" Indeed, the government made
2
every effort to ensure that the memorandum would remain secret.' Why was
the government so reluctant to have the extent of the President's constitutional
and legal authority debated in public? Was this legitimate legal advice or an
example of what one commentator has called "a jurisprudence of mere political
expedience, engaging in ... opportunistic, situational constitutionalism through
which lawyers advance whatever arguments support the president's immediate
agenda"?" In other words, was it simply a case of "giving the lady what she

wants"?"
As a legal strategy, "giving the lady what she wants" is dubious enough
when it comes to representing a corporate client in private law litigation that
will eventually be decided by an impartial decisionmaker after an adversary
proceeding.' 5 The strategy is even more dubious, however, when one is a public

11. OLC has published some of its opinions since 1977. See H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE ATTORNEYS GENERAL xv n.2 (1999). However, not all OLC opinions are
made public, and some are made public long after the fact. See, e.g., Note, The Immunity-Conferring
Power of the Office of Legal Counsel, 121 HARV. L. REV. 2086, 2090 (2008).
12.

See Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a Citizen, N.Y. TIMES

(Oct. 8, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/201 1/10/09/world/middleeast/secret-us-memo-madelegal-case-to-kill-a-citizen.html. The Second Circuit finally ordered release of the OLC opinion in
2014. See Greg Miller, Legal Memo Backing Drone Strike That Killed American Anwar al-Awlaki
Is Released, WASH. POST (June 23, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-

security/legal-memo-backing-drone-strike-is-released/2014/06/23/1 f48ddl 6-faec-l le3-8176f2c94lcf35flstory.html; Savage, Court Releases Large Parts of Memo Approving Killing of
American in Yemen, supra note 4.

13. See Cornelia T. L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive
Hands, 103 MICH. L. REV. 676, 717 (2005). See also JACK L. GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR
PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 36-37 (2007) ("The
Clinton OLC tended to invoke aggressive presidential military powers primarily for humanitarian
rather than security ends, and its arguments for presidential power were more cautious than in the
Bush II OLC and relied more on congressional authorization . . . . But . . . the Clinton lawyers-like all OLC lawyers and Attorneys General over many decades-were driven by the outlook and
the exigencies of the presidency to assert more robust presidential powers, especially during a war
or crisis, than had been officially approved by the Supreme Court or than is generally accepted in
the legal academy or by Congress."); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 647
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("The claim of inherent and unrestricted presidential powers has
long been a persuasive dialectical weapon in political controversy ... . But prudence has counseled
that actual reliance on such nebulous claims stop short of provoking a judicial test.").
14.

WENDT, supra note

1.

As Brad Wendel suggests, "[L]itigation is a special case, in which lawyers share
responsibility [with] other institutional actors for getting the law right. In counseling and
transactional representation, by contrast, the lawyer is frequently the only actor who has any power
to render a judgment about what the law permits." W. BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY
15.

TO LAW 53 (2010).
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official charged with providing legal advice that is not likely to be made public,
6
let alone scrutinized by a disinterested adjudicator.'
INTRODUCTION

OLC does not have the final word concerning government policy. Nor
does it directly enforce any law. Its sole function is to provide legal advice to
the executive branch.' But the advice it provides addresses some of the most
important questions of war and peace, the limits of executive power, the
separation of powers, civil rights, and civil liberties.'" OLC is staffed by an

16.

See, e.g., Cristian Farias, The Justice Department Can't Keep Its Own Law Secret

Forever, POLITICO (Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/08/29/thejustice-department-cant-keep-its-own-law-secret-forever-227984. Many OLC opinions will be
exempt from mandatory disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act pursuant to the
deliberative process or attorney-client privilege. See, e.g., Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in

Wash. v. U.S. Dep't of Just., No. 19-1552 (ABJ), 2021 WL 1749763, at *10 (D.D.C. May 3, 2021).
17.

See Pillard, supra note 13, at 710. Much of OLC's advice is given orally or informally.

See, e.g., Josh Gerstein, Official: FOIA Worries Dampen Requests for Formal Legal Opinions,
POLITICO (Nov. 5, 2015), https://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2015/I1/official-foiaworries-dampen-requests-for-formal-legal-opinions-215567 (discussing Obama Administration's
allegedly increased use of requests for oral advice, presumably to avoid creating documents that
might require disclosure in response to a Freedom of Information Act request). The government

regularly argues, based on Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997), that an "OLC Opinion
itself determines no 'rights or obligations' and produces no 'legal consequences.' ... OLC opinions
are predecisional and deliberative documents, produced at the request of the President or an agency,
containing candid legal advice to aid in a governmental decisionmaking process." N.H. Lottery
Comm'n v. Barr, No. 19-1835 (1st Cir. Jan. 20, 2021), Opening Brief for Appellants-Defendants,

filed

Dec.

20,

2019,

available

at

https://www.onlinepokerreport.com/wp-

content/uploads/2019/12/Wire-Act-Opening-Brief-Appellants-122019.pdf. On the other hand, it
has been argued that OLC opinions are not merely pre-decisional and deliberative documents, but
binding adjudications, in one type of circumstance, namely, when OLC, subject to possible
overruling by the President or the Attorney General, definitively resolves an inter-agency dispute
as to what the law requires. See, e.g., Campaign for Accountability v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 486

F. Supp. 3d 424, 437-41 (D.D.C. 2020). In addition, executive branch officials are required to
follow OLC opinions, and they may receive immunity if they break the law in reliance on an OLC

opinion. See The Immunity-Conferring Power of the Office of Legal Counsel, supra note 11. OLC
should not be confused with the Office of White House Counsel, which provides legal advice to the
President and has been described as "the hub of virtually all presidential activity." See Maryanne
Borrelli, Karen Hult & Nancy Kassop, The White House Counsel's Office, 31 PRESIDENTIAL
STUDIES Q. 561, 561 (2001). "Its mandate is to be watchful for and attentive to legal issues that may
arise in policy and political contexts involving the president." Id.

18. See, e.g., Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Dep't of Just., 922 F.3d 480,
483-84 (D.C. Cir. 2019) ("The OLC's responsibilities currently include '[p]reparing the formal
opinions of the Attorney General; rendering informal opinions and legal advice to the various
agencies of the Government; and assisting the Attorney General in the performance of his functions
as legal adviser to the President.' . . . Over the years, the OLC has opined on 'some of the weightiest
matters in our public life: from the [P]resident's authority to direct the use of military force without
congressional approval, to the standards governing military interrogation of "alien unlawful
combatants," to the [P]resident's power to institute a blockade of Cuba."').

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

728

[Vol. 35:2

'

Assistant Attorney General and five deputies, four of whom are political
appointees, and by a cohort of attorney-advisors, most of whom are ambitious,
19
All are
young lawyers who typically serve for relatively short terms.
appropriately interested in the success of the administration for which they
work.20 And OLC's client-the modern executive-is powerful beyond
2
measure, unbounded unless by law.
Much of OLC's advice will never be made public or be reviewed by the
courts. 22 Some opinions will come to light eventually, but only when they are

19.

See Annie L. Owens, Reforming the Office of Legal Counsel: Living Up to Its Best

Practices, AM.

CONST.

SOC'Y:

ISSUE

BRIEF

(Oct.

2020),

https://www.acslaw.org/wp-

content/uploads/2020/12/Owens-Reforming-OLC-Final.pdf.
20. See, e.g., Bradley Lipton, A Callfor InstitutionalReform of the Office ofLegal Counsel,
4 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 249, 255-56 (2010) ("The political nature of OLC is substantially
exacerbated by the type of lawyers the office tends to attract and their career ambitions. OLC's
heady task attracts an ambitious group of lawyers who seem to be particularly 'on the make."').
Although OLC is often compared to the Solicitor General's Office, the two offices are
fundamentally different in at least one important respect, as Trevor Morrison has noted: "Whereas
... the Solicitor General's aim of prevailing before the Supreme Court limits the extent to which
she can profitably pursue an extreme agenda inconsistent with the current doctrine, OLC faces no
such immediate constraint. Whether OLC honors its oft-asserted commitment to legal advice based
on its best view of the law depends largely on its own self-restraint." Trevor W. Morrison, Stare

Decisis in the Office ofLegal Counsel, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1448, 1463 (2010).
21. See, e.g., GARRY WILLS, BOMB POWER: THE MODERN PRESIDENCY AND THE NATIONAL
SECURITY STATE 2-3 (2010):
[W]e have had a continuous state of impending or partial war, with retained
constitutional restrictions. World War II faded into the Cold War, and the Cold War into
the war on terror, giving us over two-thirds of a century of war in peace, with growing
security measures, increased governmental secrecy, broad classification of information,
procedural clearances of those citizens able to know what rulers were doing in secret.
The requirements became more stringent, not less, after World War II and then again
after the Cold War. Normality never returned, and the executive power increased decade
by decade, reaching a new high in the twenty-first century-a continuous story of
unidirectional increase in the executive power.

See also New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 727-28 (1971) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) ("[T]he Executive is endowed with enormous power in the two related areas of
national defense and international relations. This power, largely unchecked by the Legislative
and Judicial branches, has been pressed to the very hilt since the advent of the nuclear missile
age. For better or for worse, the simple fact is that a President of the United States possesses
vastly greater constitutional independence in these two vital areas of power than does, say, a
prime minister of a country with a parliamentary from of government.").
22. Legal advice will be disclosed contemporaneously, of course, if the administration
believes that it would be politically beneficial to do so. For example, then-Assistant Attorney
General William Rehnquist prepared an opinion for the President with respect to the
constitutionality of the government's incursion into Cambodia during the Vietnam War. See
Memorandum from Assistant Att'y Gen., William H. Rehnquist, Off. of Legal Couns., to the Special
Counsel to the President regarding Presidential Authority to Permit Incursion into Communist
Sanctuaries in the Cambodia-Vietnam Border Area (May 31, 1970),https://www.justice.gov/sites/
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Practically speaking, the law will be whatever OLC
no longer salient.
pronounces it to be. It is critical, therefore, that OLC provide legal advice that
is faithful to the Constitution and intellectually honest. The law is sometimes
unclear, and OLC must be committed to advancing the policy goals of its client,
but that is not an excuse for "opportunistic, situational constitutionalism.""
OLC prides itself on its independence and professionalism,2 4 but not all of its
work product incarnates those values. Some important opinions have contained
highly aggressive-and sometimes spurious-advice; those opinions seem
more interested in pleasing the executive than in rigorously analyzing the
relevant law. The infamous torture memorandum25 comes immediately to mind,
but there are others. 26 OLC's performance, like that of the Justice Department
as a whole, has provided the occasion for much soul-searching. How can OLC

default/files/olc/opinions/1970/05/31/op-olc-supp-v001-p03I3_0.pdf.

Assistant Attorney General

Rehnquist also gave congressional testimony and public speeches explaining the government's
position. See, e.g., Congress, the President, and the War Powers: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 91st
Cong. 235 (1970); William H. Rehnquist, The ConstitutionalIssues - Administration Position, 45
NYU L. Rev. 628 (1970). See also ROBERT H. JACKSON, THAT MAN: AN INSIDER'S PORTRAIT OF
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 93 (John Q. Barrett ed. 2003) (discussing President Roosevelt's strategic
transmittal to Congress of Attorney General Jackson's legal opinion on the destroyers deal).
23.

See Pillard, supra note 13, at 717.

24. See, e.g., Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal Constraints
on Executive Power, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1559, 1582-83 (2007) ("Virtually all (former and current
OLC lawyers, congressional staffers and others who had worked with OLC], regardless of party or
institutional affiliation, described the primary function of OLC as ensuring the legality of executive
action, and they ranked the ability to say no to the President as an essential qualification for the job
of heading OLC."); Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., Off. of Legal
Couns., to Att'ys of the Off. of Legal Couns. regarding Best Practices for OLC Legal Advice and
Written Opinions (July 16, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2010/08/2

6/olc-legal-advice-opinions.pdf.
25. See Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., to
John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy Gen. Couns., Central Intelligence Agency, regarding Application of
United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain
Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees (May 30,

2005), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oc/legacy/2013/10/21/memo-bradbury2005.pdf;
see also, Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., Off. of Legal Couns., to John
Rizzo, Acting Gen. Couns., Central Intelligence Agency, regarding Interrogation of al Qaeda
Operative (August 1, 2002,) https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2010/08/05/me
mo-bybee2002.pdf; Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att'y
Gen., to John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy Gen. Couns., Central Intelligence Agency, regarding

Application of 18 U.S.C. §§2340-2340A to Certain Techniques That May Be Used in the
Interrogation

of
a
High
Value
al
https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/techniques.pdf.

Qaeda

Detainee

(May

10,

2005),

26. See, e.g., THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 3, 38 (Karen J. Greenberg
& Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005) (reproducing OLC Memoranda dated Sept. 25, 2001, and Jan. 9,
2002, concerning unilateral presidential power to wage war); Rachel Ward Saltzman, Executive
Power and the Office of Legal Counsel, 28 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 439 (2010).
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better perform its critical role? That question has recently received much
attention,27 and this Article seeks to advance that discussion.
First, this Article situates OLC within the context of a political system in
which the executive has grown in power far beyond anything that the founders
could have foreseen. As the chief legal advisor to the executive branch, OLC
performs a critically important function in protecting our constitutional system
and ensuring adherence to the rule of law. Second, the Article reviews the
recent recommendations of the American Constitution Society ("ACS")
concerning the reform of OLC. Among other things, those recommendations
include a systematic review of existing opinions and greater transparency going
forward. This Article generally concurs in those recommendations but also
suggests the possibility of additional reforms such as a reduction in the number
of political appointees in OLC and a focus on recruiting more experienced
lawyers to fill its ranks. Third, the Article reviews the relevant case law and
evaluates the possibility of a more fundamental reform, namely, that OLC be
given greater independence by providing the head of OLC with a fixed term
coterminous with that of the President. Finally, the Article concludes that such
a reform is legally possible and worthy of serious consideration, whether as a
matter of legislative enactment or administrative regulation.
1. CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY, THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, AND OLC

Our system of limited government is based on principles of separation of
powers, checks and balances, and the rule of law. 28 In such a government,
27.

See, e.g., Press Release, Am. Const. Soc'y, Statement on The Office of Legal Counsel

and the Rule of Law (Oct. 30, 2020), https://www.acslaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/0/OLCROL-Doc-103020.pdf ("The Department of Justice (DOJ) is in need of a renewal .... [I]ts
credibility and integrity have eroded to the point of crisis. In particular, actions of the Department's
leadership have cast doubt on its independence from the partisan and personal interests of the
president. In its refusal to collaborate with Congress on oversight matters, the Department has
retreated into a defensive, isolationist crouch.") [hereinafter ACS Statement on OLC and the Rule
of Law]. Confidence in the independence of the Department as a whole may be lower now than at
any time since Watergate, when Senator Sam Ervin proposed transferring the Department's duties
and functions to an independent agency not directly answerable to the President. See NANCY V.
BAKER, CONFLICTING LOYALTIES: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE,
1789-1990 28 (1992) (discussing Ervin plan); CORNELL W. CLAYTON, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE:
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE MAKING OF LEGAL POLICY 103-07 (1992) (same).

28. See, e.g., Philip B. Kurland, The Rise and Fall of the "Doctrine" of Separation of
Powers, 85 MICH. L. REV 592, 593 (1986) ("The original constitutional notions of division of
powers and functions were based not only on 'separation of powers,' but on a concept of 'balanced
government' and of 'checks and balances' as well."); Jeremy Waldron, Separation of Powers in

Thought and Practice, 54 B.C. L. REV. 433, 433 (2013) (We should "distinguish the separation of
powers from two other important principles that are commonly associated, if not identified with it.
These other principles are, first, the principle of the division of power-counseling us to avoid
excessive concentrations of political power in the hands of any one person, group, or agency; and,
second, the principle of checks and balances-holding that the exercise of power by any one powerholder needs to be balanced and checked by the exercise of power by other power-holders");
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policy must be rooted in law-which means that the executive must have access
to legal advice that is both rigorous and honest. The executive is now the
colossus of American government, and there is little that the executive cannot
do, especially when fortified by compliant legal advice. But the founders
intended to create a balanced government, not one in which the President is
unbounded by law. 29 As Abner Greene has argued,
[T]he framers were overwhelmingly concerned with either political
branch aggrandizing its own power without sufficient checks. To
the extent that there is any "original understanding" of the division
of power between the President and Congress, it is that both are to
be feared, neither is to be trusted, and if either one grows too strong
we might be in trouble. The framers' support for a strong, unitary
executive cannot be understood apart from the limited powers they
gave to the executive, nor apart from their need to create an executive
strong enough to counteract overreaching legislatures.
In the post-New Deal world, however, the framers' factual
assumptions have been displaced. Now, it is the President whose
power has expanded and who therefore needs to be checked.30
As Professor Greene further notes, the modern Congress has delegated
substantial lawmaking authority to the President,3 contrary to the founders'
expectation that each branch would jealously guard its own power.3 2 In
addition, the President increasingly has chosen to govern through unilateral

William Lucy, Access to Justice and the Rule of Law, 40 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 377 (2020)
(discussing aspects of the rule of law).

29.

See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641 (1952) (Jackson, J.,

concurring) ("The example of such unlimited executive power that must have most impressed the
forefathers was the prerogative exercised by George III, and the description of its evils in the
Declaration of Independence leads me to doubt that they were creating their new Executive in his
image."); but see GARRY WILLS, supra note 21, at 241 ("Few people even consider, anymore,
Madison's lapidary pronouncement, 'In republican government the legislative authority,
necessarily, predominates.' Instead, we are all, as citizens, asked to salute our Commander in
Chief.") (internal citation omitted) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison)).
30.

See Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Eraof PresidentialLawmaking, 61 U.

CH. L. REv. 123, 125 (1994).
31. Id. at 124 ("Presidential lawmaking presents an unusual problem for constitutional
theory. . . . [W]e live with an enormous amount of such lawmaking, and few appear ready to
condemn the system as invalid. If . .. we have accepted presidential lawmaking as constitutional,
must we accept without reservation this concentration of executive and legislative power, or should
we deem appropriate other structural responses that seek to reduce the agglomeration of presidential
power?").
32. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 29 ("But the great security against a gradual
concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who
administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist
encroachments of the others . . . . Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of
the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place.").
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presidential directives, even in the absence of delegated power.33 In recent
years, Congress has proved to be barely functional, and that also has favored
the executive branch. 34 Modern conditions have even allowed the President to
circumvent Congress's constitutional spending power, 35 diverting billions of
dollars in funds from the purposes for which they were appropriated to projects
that Congress had declined to fund. 36 The Supreme Court has added to the
President's power by embracing (at least in part) the "unitary executive" theory,
which holds that the President, by virtue of his presumed "accountability" to the
people, must have ultimate authority over all those who exercise "executive"
authority on behalf of the United States.37 In addition, the pardon power can be

33.

See generally GRAHAM G. DODDS, TAKE UP YOUR PEN: UNILATERAL PRESIDENTIAL

DIRECTIVES

IN AMERICAN

POLITICS (2013).

See, e.g., LEE H. HAMILTON, STRENGTHENING CONGRESS 3-4 (2009) ("Congress
sometimes cannot get its act together well enough to be a strong, effective, and sustained
34.

counterbalance to the power of the presidency."); THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORENSTEIN,
THE BROKEN BRANCH: HOW CONGRESS IS FAILING AMERICA AND HOW TO GET IT BACK ON
TRACK 158 (2006) ("The passivity and indifference of Congress and its leaders to their independent
and assertive role fit perfectly with the [George W.] Bush administration's assertive and protective
attitude toward executive power and its aversion to sharing information with Congress and the
public."). See also JULIAN E. ZELIZER, BURNING DOWN THE HOUSE: NEWT GINGRICH, THE FALL
OF A SPEAKER, AND THE RISE OF THENEW REPUBLICAN PARTY 293-94 (2020) ("Gingrich's scandal
wars escalated to create one of the most contentious periods in the government's history as the needs
of governance and of legislating steadily took a back seat to the imperatives of intense partisan
warfare where compromise was considered toxic and where almost any threat to destroy another
politician's career or hijack the legislative process was permissible if it was legal.").

35. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.
36. See Sierra Club v. Trump, 963 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 2020) cert. granted, 141 S. Ct. 618
(Oct. 19, 2020); California v. Trump, 963 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2020) cert. granted, 141 S. Ct. 618
(Oct. 19, 2020). Petitions for certiorari in both cases were granted on October 19, 2020. The
Supreme Court previously had stayed an injunction entered by the district court, thereby permitting
the continued diversion of funds. See Trump v. Sierra Club, 140 S. Ct. 1 (2019). See also Andrew

Solender, Biden Returning Billions Trump Divertedfor Border Wall to Pentagon, FORBES (Apr. 30,
2021),

https://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewsolender/2021/04/30/biden-returning-billions-trump-

diverted-for-border-wall-to-pentagon/?sh=lfO3bc9l 62e6.
37. See, e.g., Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020) (holding
that CFPB's single-administrator for-cause-removal feature violated the separation of powers); Free

Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010) (holding that a provision of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act violated the separation of powers because it made PCOB members removable
only for cause to be determined by the members of the SEC, who were also removable only for
cause). But see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (providing that Congress may vest the appointment of
inferior officers "in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.").
See also ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 14 (2010) ("From the standpoint of liberal legalism, the administrative state
does indeed feature an imperial executive; the critics are wrong only in thinking that anything can
be done about this fact."); Amanda Hollis-Brusky, Helping Ideas Have Consequences: Political

and Intellectual Investment in the UnitaryExecutive Theory, 1981-2000, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 197
(2011).
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used to thwart investigations into executive wrongdoing. 38 Finally, the
President derives great, extraconstitutional power from his position as head of
party, 39 something that the founders did not anticipate. 40 Indeed, one might be
tempted to conclude from recent events that the presidency is effectively
unbounded by law, so long as the opposition party lacks a supermajority in the
Senate. 4 1
Much recent criticism of the Department of Justice in general-and of
OLC in particular-has focused on the perceived shortcomings of the

38. See Carol D. Leonnig et al., Trump's Lawyer RaisedPossibilityofPardonsforManafort,
Flynn
Last
Summer,
WASH.
POST
(Mar.
28,
2018,
3:12
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trumps-lawyer-allegedly-raised-possibility-of-pardons-

for-manafort-flynn-last-summer/2018/03/28/3c5e570c-32ae-

ll e8-8abc-22a366b72f2dstory.html.

The President pardoned Manafort and Flynn after the 2020 election. See Maanvi Singh, Donald
Trump's Latest Wave of Pardons Includes Paul Manafort and Charles Kushner, GUARDIAN (Dec.
23, 2020, 9:17 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/dec/23/donald-trumps-latestwave-of-pardons-includes-paul-manafort-and-charles-kunsher. See also Peter Baker, For a
Defeated President, Pardons as an Expression of Grievance, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/24/us/politics/trump-pardon-power.html; Tim Naftali, Trump's
Pardons
Make
the
Unimaginable
Real,
ATLANTIC
(Dec.
23,
2020),
Matt
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/12/how-abuse-presidential-pardon/617473/;
Ford, The Most Unpardonable Presidential Power, NEW REPUBLIC
https://newrepublic.com/article/160420/trump-pardon-michael-flynn-giuliani.

39.

(Dec.

2,

2020),

See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, J.,

concurring) ("Party loyalties and interests, sometimes more binding than law, extend [the
President's] effective control into branches of government other than his own and he often may win,
as a political leader, what he cannot command under the Constitution. Indeed, Woodrow Wilson,
commenting on the President as leader both of his party and of the Nation, observed, 'If he rightly
interpret the national thought and boldly insist upon it, he is irresistible ... . His office is anything
he has the sagacity and force to make it."').
40. See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson & Richard Pildes, Separationof Parties, Not Powers, 119
HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2313-14 (2006) (noting that, although the rise of the party system almost
immediately altered the system of inter-branch competition that the founders contemplated,
"Madison's account of rivalrous, self-interested branches is [still] embraced as an accurate depiction
of political reality and a firm foundation for the constitutional law of separation of powers").
41. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 6 ("When the President of the United States is tried, the
Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds
of the Members present."); see also, Sam Levine & Lauren Gambino, Donald Trump Acquitted in
Second Impeachment Trial, OBSERVER (Feb. 13, 2021, 7:12 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/usMichael D. Shear & Nicholas
news/2021/feb/13/donald-trump-acquitted-impeachment-trial;

Fandos, Republicans Block Impeachment Witnesses, Clearing Path for Trump Acquittal, N.Y.
TIMES

(Jan. 31, 2020),

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/31/us/politics/trump-impeachment-

trial.html; Igor Derysh, Senate Juror Mitch McConnell Brags that He's Coordinating Trump's
Impeachment Trial with White House, SALON (Dec.
13, 2019, 2:52 PM),
https://www.salon.com/2019/12/13/senate-juror-mitch-mcconnell-brags-that-hes-coordinatingtrumps-impeachment-trial-with-white-house/.
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2
Department's political leadership during the Trump era.4 That focus is not
43
surprising, given that the abuses of the Trump Administration are still so raw.
One is hard-pressed, for example, to think of another recent administration that
has so consistently thwarted Congress's efforts to exercise its oversight
authority.44 But the line between the institutional interests of the presidency and
the political and personal interests of a current incumbent is not always clear;
nor is there any consensus about just how independent the Department of Justice
should be. The Department is situated in the executive branch, and law
enforcement is an important executive function. Surely the President's general
views on antitrust enforcement should be taken into account, for example, but

42. See, e.g., Katie Benner, Barr Leaves a Legacy Defined by Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/28/us/politics/William-barr2020),
trump.html?searchResultPosition=l; Katie Benner, Barr's Approach Closes Gap Between Justice

Dept.

and

White

House,

N.Y.

TIMES

(Sept.

25,

2020),

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/25/us/politics/william-barr-justicedepartment.html?searchResultPosition=1; Michael S. Schmidt & Nick Corasaniti, Justice Dept.

Aids

Trump's False Narrative on
Voting,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
25,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/25/us/politics/mail-ballots-pennsylvania-justicedepartment.html?searchResultPosition=1; Aaron Blake, A GOP-Appointed Judge's Scathing
Review of William Barr's "Candor" and "Credibility," Annotated, WASH. POST (Mar. 5, 2020,
5:32 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/03/05/gop-appointed-judges-scathingreview-william-barrs-candor-credibility-annotated/; Natasha Bertrand, The Critical Part of
Mueller's

Report
That Barr Didn't Mention, ATLANTIC
(Mar.
26,
2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/03/barrs-summary-omits-key-aspect-muellersreport/585703/. A federal district judge recently found that the Department of Justice was not
entitled, under Exemption 5 of the Freedom of Information Act, to withhold documents prepared in
connection with Attorney General William Barr's response to the Mueller investigation. The court
held that the Department's claim was based on untruthful affidavits. See, e.g., Citizens for

Responsibility and Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep't of Just., No. 19-1552 (ABJ), 2021 WL 1749763
(D.D.C. May 3, 2021). The court found that:
[T]he [government's] affidavits are so inconsistent with evidence in the record, they are
not worthy of credence. The review of the unredacted document in camera reveals that
suspicions voiced by the judge in [an earlier litigation] and the plaintiff here were wellfounded, and that not only was the Attorney General being disingenuous then, but DOJ
has been disingenuous to this Court with respect to the existence of a decision-making
process that should be shielded by the deliberative process privilege. The agency's
redactions and incomplete explanations obfuscate the true purpose of the memorandum,
and the excised portions belie the notion that it fell to the Attorney General to make a
prosecution decision or that any such decision was on the table at any time.

Id. at 25.
&

43. See, e.g., MASHA GESSEN, SURVIVING AUTOCRACY (2020); STEVEN LEVTISKY
DANIEL ZIBLATT, How DEMOCRACIES DIE (2018); YASCHA MOUNK, THE PEOPLE VS.
DEMOCRACY: WHY OUR FREEDOM IS IN DANGER AND How TO SAVE IT (2018).
44.

See, e.g., Liz Hempowicz & Anne Tindall, Trump won't Cooperate with Congressional

Here Are Congress's Options, WASH. POST (Sept. 15, 2020, 5:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/09/15/trump-wont-cooperate-with-congressionalCounsel from
of Agency
Attempted Exclusion
oversight-here-are-congresss-options/;
Oversight.

Congressional Depositions of Agency Employees, 43 Op. O.L.C., at

1 (May 23, 2019).
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what if the President urges enforcement against only a few firms, all or most of
whom he considers to be his political enemies?45 Similarly, the Department
should be responsive to the President's views when it sets criminal law
enforcement priorities, but should the President be able to dictate the
6
prosecution (or non-prosecution) of particular individuals?4 And what role
should the Department play when advising the President concerning the extent
and limits of his power?4 7 Should OLC approve the executive's preferred
course of action whenever defending it in litigation would not violate Rule 11?48
In short, the problems that concern us did not arise with the Trump
Administration. They are longstanding and deep-seated; they reflect the
necessarily ambiguous relationship of the Department of Justice and the
President. They touch on the proper meaning and sweep of the "vesting
clause," 4 9 and on a proper understanding of the President's duty to "take [c]are
that the [f]aws be faithfully executed.""

45. See, e.g., Spencer Weber Waller & Jacob E. Morse, The Political Misuse of Antitrust:
Doing the Right Thing for the Wrong Reason, COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L (July 16, 2020),
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/the-political-misuse-of-antitrust-doing-the-rightthing-for-the-wrong-reason/.
46.

See, e.g., Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, May Federal Prosecutors Take Direction

from the President?, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1817 (2019); Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Can
the President Control the Department ofJustice?, 70 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2018). See also Eli Watkins,
Donald Trump Laments he's 'Not Supposed' to Influence DOJ, FBI, CNN (Nov. 3, 2017),
("'The
https://www.cnn.com/2017/ 1/02/politics/donald-trump-justice-department-fbi/index.htm
saddest thing is that because I'm the President of the United States, I am not supposed to be involved
with the Justice Department,' Trump said. 'I am not supposed to be involved with the FBI .... I'm
very unhappy with it that the Justice Department isn't going [after Secretary Clinton],' Trump said.
'I am not supposed to be doing the kind of things that I would love to be doing. And I am very
frustrated by it."').
47. Attorney General Caleb Cushing observed that the Attorney General was "not a counsel
giving advice to the Government as his client, but a public officer, acting judicially, under all the
solemn responsibilities of conscience and of legal obligation." See Caleb Cushing, Office and Duties
of Attorney General, 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 326, 334 (1854). Interestingly, the Israeli Attorney General's
role is conceived in that way. See YOAV DOTAN, LAWYERING FOR THE RULE OF LAW:
GOVERNMENT LAWYERS AND THE RISE OF JUDICIAL POWER IN ISRAEL 54-57 (2014). But see H.
JEFFERSON POWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL

CONSCIENCE:

THE MORAL DIMENSION

OF JUDICIAL

DECISION 77 (2008) ("A political-branch lawyer .. . is thus in much the same quandary as a Supreme
Court justice: there is no way to exclude politics in the sense I am using the term, by technique or
by moral effort, and yet the very shape of her tasks assumes that law is not simply politics.").
Another commentator suggests that the Attorney General's role is indistinguishable from that of a
private lawyer representing a private client. See Nelson Lund, Rational Choice at the Office ofLegal

Counsel, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 437, 449 (1993). See also William H. Rehnquist, The Old Order
Changeth: The Department of Justice Under John Mitchell, 12 ARIZ. L. REV. 251, 254-56 (1970)
(contrasting the Johnson and Nixon administrations' views of the proper function of the Department
of Justice).

48.
49.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.
U.S. CONST. art II, § I, cl.

1("The executive

Power shall be vested in a President of the

United States of America.").
50.

Id. § 3 ("[H]e shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.").
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II. THE ACS PROPOSAL
ACS recently offered several recommendations designed to "reposition
OLC around its core tradition of providing independent legal advice that offers
its attorneys' best view of the law to the president and executive branch
actors." 51 "It is vital," ACS wrote, "that an office within government perform
this function to help ensure ongoing respect for a basic principle of our
constitutional system-that executive action is constrained by law."" ACS
specific
followed by three
guiding principles,
articulated three
recommendations. The three guiding principles were that OLC should explicate
and defend the separation of powers "through careful consideration of the
authorities and interests of the different branches of government;" that it must
"strive[] to provide independent legal advice ... that makes clear the limits the
Constitution and statutes place on the executive's authority to act;" and that it
"must help promote accountability for the executive branch, which requires
demonstrating a good-faith and robust commitment to transparency.""
ACS's first specific recommendation was that OLC's new leadership
should survey its recent work product "to identify opinions or advice that fail to
promote a legitimate interpretation of the law at issue, or that advance a
conception of the separation of powers that unduly shields the president or the
executive branch from scrutiny and accountability;" that those opinions and
advice should be subjected to vigorous review; and that those that fail the test
should be rescinded.54 ACS's second specific recommendation was that OLC's
new leadership should "articulate[] its rule-of-law values as principles and
practices to bind its interpretation and analysis" in two ways: (1) by articulating
"a set of best practices both tied to Office traditions and reflective of the
changing structure and distribution of authority within the executive branch,"
and (2) by "draft[ing] a new charter [of powers] that takes account of
developments over the last quarter century in the law and politics of the
separation of powers.""
According to ACS, OLC's new statement of "best practices" should
contain three commitments: (1) to provide the President and the executive
branch "with [OLC's] best view of what the law requires, rather than with
advice that gives [OLC's] imprimatur . .. to legal justifications that are merely
colorable or arguably defensible," (2) to "articulate structural and substantive

51.

See ACS Statement on OLC and the Rule of Law, supra note 27, at 8.

52.
53.

Id.
Id. at 2 -3.

54. Id. at 3. ACS further explains: "Over the last four years, the Office has issued and made
publicly available opinions that arguably distort the separation of powers by brooking no
recognition for Congress's prerogatives as a co-equal branch, in high-visibility disputes with
Congress over politically charged legal questions."Id. ACS's proposed "retrospective review would
help determine whether and to what extent . . . reconsideration is required for OLC to sustain its
credibility as a source of legal interpretation appropriately insulated from policy and political
pressures." Id. at 5.

55.

Id. at 5.
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strategies for ensuring that its advice remains independent from partisan
political pressures," and (3) to "articulat[e] a strong presumption in favor of
publishing its final formal opinions. "6
With respect to the new "charter of powers," ACS recommends that
OLC's new leadership make "a serious study of separation of powers
jurisprudence that has emerged since 1996 [when OLC prepared the
memorandum upon which it currently relies], as well as a study of the major
separation of powers conflicts between Congress and the executive branch that
may never have reached the courts, or as they played out before the Supreme
Court intervened, including the [OLC] opinions ... that have been part of that
conflict." 7 OLC's objective should be to chart an approach to separation of
powers that is "less combative, more functional and [more] consistent."58
ACS's third specific recommendation was that OLC should adopt a strong
presumption in favor of timely publication of its final opinions. "[T]here will
be exceptions for classified, privileged, or sensitive material. But the value of
transparency in promoting accountability should guide OLC's decision-

making." 59
The ACS suggestions are well-taken. The only question is whether they
go far enough.
The seriousness of OLC's shortcomings over several
administrations may suggest the need for a more radical solution than simply
exhorting future OLC leaders to do better. To be sure, the professionalism and
good faith of those who staff OLC is essential, and every effort should be made
to encourage the return of that ethos to OLC. Transparency is equally important,
and OLC advice should be made public to the greatest extent possible,
consistent with the necessities of governing. On the other hand, are there
personnel and structural reforms that Congress or the executive could initiate to
reinforce positive change through greater institutional independence? If so,
further questions arise as to what the optimal level of independence might be
and whether attaining that level of independence is legally possible, given the
recent trend in Supreme Court jurisprudence.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND

The founders recognized the need for executive offices in addition to those
of the President and Vice President. We know that because the Constitution
specifies the manner in which "Officers of the United States" are to be
appointed, and it also specifically empowers the President to "require the
Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive
Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective
Offices." 60 But the founders left the structure and design of the executive

56. Id.
57. Id. at 7.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 7-8.
60.

See U.S. CONST. art. II,

§ 2, cl. 1-2.
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6
branch to Congress. Under the "necessary and proper" clause, 1 Congress may
create and abolish executive departments, as well as particular offices or
bureaus within the departments; prescribe the duties that attach to those offices
and departments; transfer duties from one office or department to another; and
62
The founders also
prescribe qualifications for service in those offices.
specifically provided that principal officers must be appointed by the President,
with the advice and consent of the Senate, but they left Congress to decide
whether the power to appoint "inferior Officers" should be vested "in the
63
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." Since
the Court's decision in Marbury v. Madison, it has also been clear that Congress
may impose on executive officials specific statutory duties that must be
discharged according to the terms of the relevant law, without regard to the
64
President's wishes.
The precise degree to which Congress may exercise its power without
infringing on the constitutional powers of the executive has long been
contested. 65 During the time of the Watergate scandal, for example, Senator
Sam Ervin, who was generally considered to be the Senate's preeminent
constitutional lawyer, introduced legislation that would have freed the Justice
Department from direct presidential control; his proposed legislation would

61.

See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.

62. See Mary M. Cheh, When Congress Commands a Thing to Be Done: An Article on
Marbury v. Madison, Executive Inaction, and the Duty of the Courts to Enforce the Law, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 253, 259 (2003).
Thus, Marbury makes plain that it is Congress's job to create the executive offices
of the United States, to set the terms of those offices, and to identify the bases for

removal.
Finally, Marbury established that Congress may prescribe the duties to be
performed by executive officials, and that, if they are commanded to perform certain
acts, they are accountable to the law only. Their acts may not be controlled by the
President and, should they fail in their duty, the laws of the country will afford a remedy
to any person injured as a result.

Id.
63.

See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.

64.

See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 158 (1803) ("It is the duty ofthe Secretary of State

to conform to the law, and in this he is an officer of the United States, bound to obey the laws. He
acts, in this respect, as has been very properly stated at the bar, under the authority of law, and not
by the instructions of the President. It is a ministerial act which the law enjoins on a particular
officer for a particular purpose.").

65.

See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926) (Taft, C.J.) ("[T]he reasonable

implication, even in the absence of express words, was that as part of his executive power he should
select those who were to act for him under his direction in the execution of the laws. The further
implication must be . . . that as his selection of administrative officers is essential to the execution
of the laws by him, so must be his power of removing those for whom he cannot continue to be
responsible."). Justices McReynolds, Holmes, and Brandeis dissented. Justice Holmes wrote that,
"[t]he duty of the President to see that the laws be executed is a duty that does not go beyond the
laws or require him to achieve more than Congress sees fit to leave within his power." Id. at 295
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
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have transformed the Department into an independent agency, with the Attorney
General and two other key officials being appointed by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate, serving set terms that would not coincide with
the President's, and being removable only for cause. 66 Jimmy Carter made a
similar proposal during the 1976 presidential campaign. 67
The Ervin bill was widely opposed by constitutional law scholars and
failed to advance. 68 While the bill was criticized on numerous grounds, "one
study found constitutional infirmity in the attempt . . . to transfer the total
Department rather than specific Department functions." 69 According to that
study, removal of the entire Department from presidential oversight would have
interfered with the President's ability to see that the laws are faithfully executed,
to recommend legislation to Congress, and to decide whether to approve or veto
legislation. 70 What seems particularly troublesome is the provision that would

66.

See S. 2803, 93d Cong. (1973). The bill provided that the President would appoint the

Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, and the Solicitor General, with the advice and
consent of the Senate, to six-year terms. Senator Ervin explained, in introducing the bill, that, "[a]ll
subordinate officers in the Department, including the Director of the [FBI], would be appointed by
the Attorney General. The officers appointed by the President would be removable by the Chief
Executive only for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office. They, accordingly, would be protected
under the doctrine of the Humphrey's Executor and Wiener cases." See Removing Politics from the
Administration of Justice: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the
Committee on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. at 4 (1974) (Opening Statement of Sen. Ervin). The bill
obviously was the product of Senator Ervin's reflections on the abuses of the Nixon Justice
Department. Ironically, Chief Justice Rehnquist, while serving as an Assistant Attorney General in
the Nixon Administration in 1970, had criticized Ramsey Clark, President Johnson's Attorney
General, for leading the Department of Justice in a way more appropriate to "a European 'Ministry
of Justice,' where in effect the Department or Ministry is itself responsible for the end product that
emerges from the administration of the system of criminal justice," rather than as simply another
participant in the adversary process. See William H. Rehnquist, The Old Order Changeth: The

Department of Justice Under John Mitchell, 12 ARIz. L. REv. 251, 255 (1970).
67. See I COMM. ON HOUSE ADMIN., U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 1976: JIMMY CARTER 490, 618 (1978) (proposing fixed term for
Attorney General, removable for malfeasance mutually determined by President and designated
congressional leaders); GRIFFIN B. BELL WITH RONALD J. OSTROW, TAKING CARE OF THE LAW 28
(1982). OLC advised Judge Bell that "there is serious doubt as to the constitutionality of such
legislation," and he so advised the President. Proposals Regarding an Independent Attorney
General, 77 Op. O.L.C. 75 (Apr. I1, 1977). At about the same time, OLC suggested that legislation
to create inspectors general was also unconstitutional. See Inspector General Legislation, 77 Op.

O.L.C. 16 (Feb. 21, 1977).
68. See Watergate Reorganization and Reform Act of 1975: Hearings Before the Committee
on Government Operations, 94th Cong., 288-95 (1976).

69.

Id. at 288.

70. Id. In 2008, Senators Russ Feingold and Diane Feinstein introduced a more limited bill,
entitled the OLC Reporting Act of 2008, which would have required the Attorney General to report
to Congress whenever the Department issued certain kinds of "authoritative legal interpretation[s]"
of "Federal statute[s]." See S. 3501, 1 10th Cong., § 2 (2008). According to the Senate Committee
Report, "The purpose of the [bill was] to provide a targeted response to a particularly problematic
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have granted the Attorney General and two other key officials a set term that
would not have been coterminous with that of the President. In other words,
not only would the Attorney General and two other high-ranking officials be
protected from termination (except for cause) during their terms, they might
also be individuals who were chosen by the incumbent President's predecessor,
and they might be wholly unsympathetic to the incumbent President's goals and
policies.7 ' How could the President "take care that the laws be faithfully
executed" if the principal members of the President's legal team were neither
chosen by the President nor answerable to him? In retrospect, the bill seems
premised on a somewhat naive view that law and policy can be wholly separated
in our constitutional system and on a lack of attentiveness to their necessary
connections.72

manifestation of 'secret law'-secret legal opinions issued by the Department of Justice (DOJ) that
effectively exempt the executive branch from compliance with federal statutes." See S. Rep. No.
110-528, at 1 (2008). The Bush Administration strongly opposed the legislation, which was not
enacted. See, e.g., Letter from Michael B. Mukasey, Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Just., to Hon. Harry
Reid, Majority Leader, United States Senate (Nov. 14, 2008); see also Kel McClanahan, How One

Secretive Justice Department Office Can Sway the Whole Government, WASH. POST (Sept. 26,
2019),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/09/26/how-one-secretive-justice-

department-office-can-sway-whole-government/.
71. Given the present degree of political polarization in the country, as well as the deep
distrust that currently characterizes the relations of the two principal political parties, it is difficult
to believe that anyone today would propose such a solution to the problem of Justice Department
politicization. To imagine the difficulties that a President might face from having to govern with
the assistance of an Attorney General who was appointed by his or her predecessor, and is
removable only for cause, one need only think of the fraught intra-branch relations that sometimes
exist at the beginning of a new President's term, when the Department of Justice may be led for a
short time by a hold-over from the previous administration. The beginning weeks of the Trump
Administration are instructive in that regard. See, e.g., Marty Lederman, Sally Yates Did the Right
Thing, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/37029/sally-yates/; see also
Sally Q. Yates, Protect the Justice Departmentfrom PresidentTrump, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/28/opinion/sally-yates-protect-the-justice-department-from-pre
sident-trump.html. This Article suggests that the head of OLC might be given a fixed term, either
by statute or by administrative regulation, see infra at 749, but the current proposal suffers from
none of the infirmities identified with respect to Senator Ervin's bill. First, the Attorney General
and other top leadership of the Department of Justice would not be insulated from presidential
control. Second, the President would never have to rely for the execution of the laws on a head of
OLC or on any other officer of the Department of Justice who had been appointed by the President's
predecessor. Third, the head of OLC, unlike the Attorney General, does not directly enforce any
law, and any determination made by the head of OLC would be subject to revision or reversal by
the Attorney General or the President. Finally, this proposal, unlike Senator Ervin's, is fully
consistent with a proper understanding of the essential connections between law and policymaking.
72. Justice Jackson reflected on the close connections between law and policy in his account
of President Roosevelt's decision to exchange destroyers for leases on British bases, and to do so
by executive agreement, rather than asking Congress to enact new legislation:
It will disappoint those who imagine that the President decided to go it on his own and
ordered the Attorney General to turn out a sustaining opinion to learn that the Attorney
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In his opening statement at the Senate hearing on S. 2803, Senator Ervin
did not focus on the possible objections to transferring all law enforcement
responsibilities to an entity beyond the immediate control of the President.
Senator Ervin invoked two Supreme Court cases in support of his proposed
legislation-Wiener v. United States?3 and Humphrey's Executor v. United
States.74 But he made no mention of the Court's earlier decision in Myers v.
UnitedStates,75 which has now become the standard against which the Supreme
Court evaluates the constitutionality of all structural innovations. In the 1970s,
Myers did not cast such a long shadow, and Senator Ervin understandably may
have thought that the case was not relevant to his project; he intended to create
an independent agency, and, as Wiener and Humphrey 's Executor made clear,
fixed terms and "for cause" removal provisions were constitutionally
permissible in that context. Moreover, Senator Ervin doubtless understood that
the legal question in Myers was not whether Congress, in the exercise of its
undisputed authority to provide for the architecture of the executive branch,
could constitutionally create an executive position with a fixed term; the narrow
question presented in Myers was whether Congress could empower the Senate
to override the President's decision to remove a particular executive official.
In addition, the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on the
subject was Justice Frankfurter's opinion for a unanimous Court in Wiener,
which viewed much of the Myers opinion as unnecessary (and unwarranted)
dicta, and reaffirmed Congress's power to specify the conditions for removing
members of independent agencies. 76 In Wiener, Justice Frankfurter parsed the
earlier decisions:

General advised some time before the decision itself that existing law gave the president
the necessary power. The legal opinion, far from being the result of the President's
decision, was a contributing factor in reaching it, as may be inferred from the fact that
the opinion was sent to Congress and the country to accompany the message announcing
the exchange.
ROBERT H. JACKSON, THAT MAN: AN INSIDER'S PORTRAIT OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 93 (John

Q. Barrett
73.
74.
75.

ed. 2003).
Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).

76. Wiener involved a back-pay claim by a former War Claims Commissioner who
maintained that he had been unlawfully removed from his position. Wiener, 357 U.S. 349. The case
was largely indistinguishable from Humphrey's Executor, the main difference being that the
Commission was meant to be short-lived, and Congress had not specified the members' terms apart
from setting the Commission's sunset date. "This limit on the Commission's life was the mode by
which the tenure of the Commissioners was defined, and Congress made no provision for removal
of a Commissioner." Id. at 350. The Wiener Court also noted that, in the absence of specific statutory
language concerning removal, "the most reliable factor for drawing an inference regarding the
President's power of removal is the nature of the function that Congress vested in
the ... Commission." Id. at 353. In Wiener, "[a]s in Humphrey's Executor ... the Commissioners
were entrusted by Congress with adjudicatory powers that were to be exercised free from executive

control." Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 688 (1988).
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Speaking through a Chief Justice who himself had been President,
the Court [in Myers] did not restrict itself to the immediate issue
before it, the President's inherent power to remove a postmaster,
obviously an executive official. As of set purpose and not by way of
parenthetic casualness, the Court announced that the President had
inherent constitutional power of removal also of officials who have
"duties of a quasi-judicial character * * * whose decisions after
hearing affect interests of individuals, the discharge of which the
President cannot in a particular case properly influence or control."
Within less than ten years a unanimous Court, in Humphrey's
narrowly confined the scope of the
Executor v. United States ...
Myers decision to include only "all purely executive officers." The
Court explicitly "disapproved" the expressions in Myers supporting
the President's inherent constitutional power to remove members of
quasi-judicial bodies.
And what is the essence of the decision in Humphrey's case? It drew
a sharp line of cleavage between officials who were part of the
Executive establishment and were thus removable by virtue of the
President's constitutional powers, and those who are members of a
body "to exercise its judgment without the leave or hindrance of any
other official or any department of the government," as to whom a
power of removal exists only if Congress may fairly be said to have
conferred it.77
The Wiener Court read Humphrey's Executor as having drawn "a sharp
line of cleavage between officials who were part of the Executive establishment
and [therefore] removable by virtue of the President's constitutional powers,
and those who are members of a body 'to exercise its judgment without the
leave or hindrance of any other official or any department of the government,"'
who may be removed by the President "only if Congress may fairly be said to
have conferred" that power.78 Wiener made clear that Congress could grant
77. Wiener, 357 U.S. at 351-53 (internal citations omitted). Many contemporary admirers
of the Myers decision view it as an example of originalism. As Robert Post has recently shown,
however, Chief Justice Taft "was unwilling to rest his conclusion entirely on evidence of original
meaning," and the opinion relies as much on the Chief Justice's policy judgments about effective
presidential leadership as on original meaning. See Robert Post, Tension in the Unitary Executive:
How Taft Constructedthe Epochal Opinion ofMyers v. United States, J. SUP. CT. HIST (forthcoming
2020) (manuscript at 28), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfinabstractid=3600064. Likewise,
Professor Post shows that Chief Justice Taft's acknowledgment of Congress's constitutional
authority with respect to determining the removal rules for inferior officers "is surely not an
argument that would be embraced by contemporary advocates of a powerful 'unitary executive,'
who argue for 'a hierarchical, unified executive department under the direct control of the
President."' Id. at 31. Professor Post also notes that the Chief Justice's argument "received scathing
reviews in the scholarly literature of the time." Id.

78.

Wiener, 357 U.S. at 353.
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tenure of employment to the members of at least some independent agencies, 79
but the Wiener Court had no reason to decide whether all executive officials
must be subject to at-will removal by the President. The Court finally addressed
that question in 1988 in Morrisonv. Olson.80
In Morrison, the Court was asked to determine the constitutionality of the
independent counsel provisions of the post-Watergate Ethics in Government
Act. 8 1 The provisions, which authorized the appointment of an independent
counsel "to investigate and, if appropriate, prosecute certain high-ranking
Government officials for violations of federal criminal laws," placed the
appointment power in a specially designated court82 and the removal power in
the Attorney General; but the Attorney General was required to exercise the
removal power personally and "only for good cause, physical disability, mental
incapacity, or any other condition that substantially impairs the performance of
such independent counsel's duties."83 The provision relating to the appointment
of the independent counsel was challenged under the appointments clause and
Article III, while the removal provision and the Act as a whole were challenged
as a violation of separation of powers. 84 In an opinion by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, the Court rejected each of these contentions. 85 The Court described
the two separation of powers issues as follows:
The first is whether the provision of the Act restricting the Attorney
General's power to remove the independent counsel to only those
instances in which he can show "good cause," taken by itself,
impermissibly interferes with the President's exercise of his
constitutionally appointed functions. The second is whether, taken
as a whole, the Act violates the separation of powers by reducing the
President's ability to control the prosecutorial powers wielded by the
independent counsel. 86
The Morrison Court began its analysis of the separation of powers issues
by reaffirming the explanation of Myers that the Court had given two years
before in Bowsher v. Synar,87 namely, that "the essence of . .. Myers was the.
judgment that the Constitution prevents Congress from 'draw[ing] to
itself... the power to remove or the right to participate in the exercise of that
power. To do this would be to go beyond the words and implications of the

79. In Humphrey's Executor, the Court emphasized the "quasi-judicial" and
"quasi-legislative" nature of the Commission's work. See Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 872.

80.
81.

Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 591 et seq. The provisions lapsed in 1999. See Helen Dewar, With Few

Backers, Independent Counsel Law Is Set to Lapse, WASH. POST, June 5, 1999, at A2,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/counsels/stories/counse060599.htm.

82.
83.
84.

Morrison, 487 U.S. at 660-61 (citing to 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 & 48).
Id. at 663 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1)).
Id. at 659-60.

85.

Id. at 660. Justice Scalia dissented. Id. at 697.

86.
87.

Id. at 685.
See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
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[Appointments Clause] and to infringe the constitutional principle of the
separation of governmental powers."'88 That was not the case with respect to
the removal provision at issue in Morrison, which "puts the removal power
squarely in the hands of the Executive Branch." 89 "In our view," the Court said,
"the removal provisions of the Act make this case more analogous to
and Wiener . .. than to Myers or Bowsher." 90 The
Humphrey's Executor ...
Court then rejected the argument that "Humphrey's Executor rests on a
distinction between 'purely executive' officials and officials who exercise
'quasi-legislative' and 'quasi-judicial' powers," as well as the argument that,
"under Myers, the President must have absolute discretion to discharge 'purely
executive' officials at will."91 The Court continued: "The analysis contained in
our removal cases is designed not to define rigid categories of those officials
who may or may not be removed at will by the President, but to ensure that
Congress does not interfere with the President's exercise of the 'executive
power' and his constitutionally appointed duty to 'take care that the laws be
faithfully executed."'92 Importantly, the Court observed that "the real question
is whether the removal restrictions are of such a nature that they impede the
President's ability to perform his constitutional duty, and the functions of the
93
officials in question must be analyzed in that light."
After concluding that the removal provision did not by itself violate the
separation of powers, the Court proceeded to consider whether "the Act, taken
as a whole, violates the .. . separation of powers by unduly interfering with the
role of the Executive Branch." The Court again noted that the Act was not an
attempt by Congress to increase its own powers at the expense of the
Executive's; nor did it work any judicial usurpation of properly executive
functions.95
Finally, the Court held that although "[i]t is undeniable that the Act
reduces the amount of control or supervision that the Attorney General and,
through him, the President exercises over the investigation and prosecution of a
certain class of alleged criminal activity," the Act did not impermissibly
undermine the powers of the Executive Branch or disrupt the proper balance
between the branches by preventing the Executive from performing its
constitutionally assigned functions. 96 The Court observed that the Attorney
General's authority was limited in that he could not appoint the individual of
97
his choice, determine the counsel's jurisdiction, or remove her without cause.

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Morrison, 487 U.S. at 686.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 688-89.
Id. at 689-90.
Id. at 691.
Id. at 693.
See id. at 694-95.
Id. at 695.
Id. at 695-96.
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But the Court found that these limitations were balanced by provisions that gave
the Attorney General the exclusive power to request the appointment of an
independent counsel, provided for "good cause" removal (which preserved the
Executive's "substantial ability to ensure that the laws are 'faithfully executed'
by an independent counsel"), and made the independent counsel's jurisdiction
dependent on the facts submitted by the Attorney General and its exercise
subject to general Department of Justice policy.98 The Court concluded:
Notwithstanding the fact that the counsel is to some degree
"independent" and free from executive supervision to a greater
extent than other federal prosecutors, in our view these features of
the Act give the Executive Branch sufficient control over the
independent counsel to ensure that the President is able to perform
his constitutionally assigned duties.99
In 2010, the Court returned to removal in the context of independent
agencies. In Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board,100 the Court invalidated a provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that
protected the members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
("PCAOB") from removal by the members of the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") except "for good cause shown." 0 ' Citing Myers, Chief
Justice Roberts noted that "the Constitution has been understood [since 1789]
to empower the President to keep these officers accountable-by removing
them from office, if necessary," but that the Court has nonetheless held that the

98.

Id. at 696.

99. Id. Justice Scalia dissented. Id. at 697. Justice Scalia started from the proposition that
Article II, Section 1, clause 1 vests in the President "not . . some of the executive power, but all of
the executive power." Id. at 705. The statute therefore required invalidation "on fundamental
separation-of-powers principles if the following two questions are answered affirmatively: (1) Is
the conduct of a criminal prosecution (and of an investigation to decide whether to prosecute) the
exercise of purely executive power? (2) Does the statute deprive the President of the United States
of exclusive control over the exercise of that power?" Id. Since he answered both questions in the
affirmative, he would have invalidated the statute. Id. Justice Scalia's dissent has many admirers.
See, e.g., Noel J. Francisco, Justice Scalia: ConstitutionalConservative, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 2169,
2171 (2017) ("Justice Scalia's dissent in Morrison v. Olson is regarded by many as his
masterpiece."). Alfred Aman and Carol Greenhouse have noted that, notwithstanding the current
influence of the unitary executive theorists, "the durability of Humphrey's Executor is impressive."

Alfred C. Aman, Jr. & Carol J. Greenhouse, Fire Power: ConstitutionalLimits and Institutional
Norms Governing the United States President'sPower of Removal in PENsER LE DROIT A PARTIR
DE L'INDIVIDU: MELANGES EN L'HONNEUR D'ELISABETH ZOLLER 15 (2018). Professors Aman and
Greenhouse also emphasize the importance of certain rule-of-law norms that limit the President's
removal power, even absent "for cause" protection. Id.

100.
101.

561 U.S. 477 (2010).
See 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(6). Under the statute, "good cause" required a finding, made

"on the record" and "after notice and opportunity for a hearing," that the Board member has
"willfully violated any provision of this Act," "willfully abused [his or her] authority," or, "without
reasonable justification or excuse, has failed to enforce compliance with any such provision or rule,
or any professional standard by any registered public accounting firm or any associated person

thereof." See 15 U.S.C. § 7217(d)(3).
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removal power is "not without limit." 10 2 Thus, in Humphrey's Executor, "we
held that Congress can, under certain circumstances, create independent
agencies run by principal officers appointed by the President, whom the
103
Further, "the
President may not remove at will but only for good cause."
Court [has] sustained similar restrictions on the power of principal executive
[branch] officers-themselves responsible to the President-to remove their
own inferiors."104
According to the Chief Justice, Free Enterprise presented a novel
question, namely, whether Congress violates the Constitution when it provides
for more than one level of "for cause" removal protection. The Chief Justice
stated the question: "[W]hether these separate layers of protection may be
combined. May the President be restricted in his ability to remove a principal
officer, who is in turn restricted in his ability to remove an inferior officer, even
though that inferior officer determines the policy and enforces the laws of the
United States?"'05 That issue was presented in Free Enterprise because the
members of the PCAOB were removable only for cause by the SEC
commissioners, who were themselves assumed to be removable only for
cause.1 06 In a 5 to 4 vote, the Court held that "such multilevel protection from
removal is contrary to Article II's vesting of the executive power in the
President."' 07 According to the majority:
The President cannot "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed" if he cannot oversee the faithfulness of the officers who
execute them. Here the President cannot remove an officer who
enjoys more than one level of good-cause protection, even if the
President determines that the officer is neglecting his duties or
discharging them improperly. That judgment is instead committed
to another officer, who may or may not agree with the President's
determination, and whom the President cannot remove simply
because that officer disagrees with him. This contravenes the
President's "constitutional obligation to ensure the faithful execution
of the laws."' 0

102.
103.

Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 483 (2010).
Id.

104. Id. The Court observed that, "[the parties do not ask us to reexamine any of these
precedents, and we do not do so." Id. at 483.

105.

Id. at 483-84.

106. Id. at 493. The parties and the majority assumed that the members of the SEC were
removable only for cause. Id. Justice Breyer's dissent provided substantial grounds for doubting the
accuracy of that assumption. Id. at 514.

107.
108.

Id. at 484.

Id. The Chief Justice further noted that,
The added layer of tenure protection makes a difference. Without a layer of insulation
between the Commission and the Board, the Commission could remove a Board member
at any time, and therefore would be fully responsible for what the Board does. The
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Finally, in Seila Law v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau,' 09 the Court
considered the constitutionality of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
("CFPB"), which was organized under the control of a single administrator
appointed for a five-year term and removable only for "inefficiency, neglect of
duty, or malfeasance in office."" 0 As in Free Enterprise, the Court viewed this
structure as an anomaly that could be upheld only if the Court were willing to
extend its prior precedents, which the Court, again by a 5-4 vote, declined to
do."' Echoing Justice Scalia's dissent in Morrison, Chief Justice Roberts
observed that, "[u]nder our Constitution, the 'executive Power'-all of it-is
'vested in a President,' who must 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully
Excavating the facts of prior cases, he then went on to explain
executed."'
that there are only two exceptions to the President's unrestricted removal power:
In Humphrey's Executor . . . we held that Congress could create
expert agencies led by a group of principal officers removable by the
President only for good cause. And in ... Morrison v. Olson ... we
held that Congress could provide tenure protections to certain
inferior officers with narrowly defined duties. We are now asked to
extend these precedents to a new configuration: an independent
agency that wields significant executive power and is run by a single
individual who cannot be removed by the President unless certain
statutory criteria are met .... [T]here are compelling reasons not to
extend those precedents to the novel context of an independent
agency led by a single Director. Such an agency lacks a foundation
in historical practice and clashes with constitutional structure by
concentrating power in a unilateral actor insulated from Presidential
control.'

President could then hold the Commission to account for its supervision of the Board, to
the same extent that he may hold the Commission to account for everything else it does.
Id. at 495-96. However, as Justice Breyer pointed out in his dissent, the President's power to hold
the SEC responsible "for everything else it does" would be severely limited by the first layer of "for
cause" removal protection in any event, assuming that the majority was correct in its belief that the
members of the SEC were themselves protected from termination except for cause. See id at 496.

109.
110.

Il1.
112.

Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020).
See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5491(b)(1), (b)(2), (c)(1), (c)(3).
Seila, 140 S. Ct. at 2192.
Id. at 2191.

113. Id. at 2192. Rather than invalidating the statute, the Court severed the removal
provision-a result in which the dissenters concurred, see id. at 2217, but from which Justice
Thomas and Justice Gorsuch dissented. See id. 2211. Justice Thomas commended the Court for
limiting Humphrey's Executor, but suggested that it should be overruled in the future. Id at 2211.
Justice Kagan noted in dissent that the Court traditionally had left most decisions about the structure
of the Executive Branch "to Congress and the President, acting through legislation they both agree
to." Id. at 2224. That included creating "zones of administrative independence" through "for cause"
limitations on the President's removal power for the Federal Reserve, the Federal Trade
Commission, and the National Labor Relations Board. "Those statutes, whose language the Court
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At the most general level, Free Enterpriseand Seila may be seen to reflect
an embrace of the unitary executive theory and a lack of sympathy for the
administrative state. Taken at face value, they also seem to reflect a somewhat
naive view of presidential accountability. 1 4 Those attitudes are manifested in
the Court's technique, namely excavating and attributing constitutional
significance to the facts of its earlier precedents as a way of creating narrowing
distinctions that bear only the slightest relationship to the Court's reasoning in
those earlier cases. For now, however, Humphrey's Executor and Morrison
remain good law on their own terms, and it is difficult to see how much further
the Court can go in hollowing out these precedents without bringing down such
fundamental, indispensable aspects of our current constitutional order as the
independence of the Federal Reserve Board." 5 Justices Thomas and Gorsuch
might be willing to go to that extreme, but it would be surprising if others were
not ultimately persuaded by Justice Kagan's warnings in Seila.16
IV. THE POSSIBILITIES FOR REFORM

Given the state of the law, what might be done to ensure a greater degree
of independence and professionalism for OLC? First, as ACS has suggested,
OLC should be as transparent as possible, consistent with the true necessities of
governing, and it should be committed to understanding the separation of
powers from the perspectives of each of the branches of government, not simply

repeatedly has approved, provide the model for the removal restriction before us today. If precedent
were any guide, that provision would have survived its encounter with this Court-and so would

the intended independence of the [CFPB]." Id. at 2224-25.
114. See, e.g., PETER M. SHANE, MADISON'S NIGHTMARE: How EXECUTIVE POWER
THREATENS AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 161-62 (2009) ("[Dlespite common references to a
presidential candidate's unique "national constituency," a presidential candidate is subject to
election only twice-and only once after the country has actually witnessed the President's
performance . . . . During both an initial campaign and another for reelection, a presidential
candidate knows that his detailed stances on matters of policy are not likely to make decisive
differences in his political fortunes."). Moreover, the indirect nature of the role played by the people
in the election of the President cannot be overemphasized. See, e.g., JESSE WEGMAN, LET THE
PEOPLE PICK THE PRESIDENT: THE CASE FOR ABOLISHING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE (2020).
115. As Christine Chabot has noted, the Seila majority seem to have recognized that the
Federal Reserve might prove problematic and seemingly "held open the possibility that the 'Federal
Reserve can claim a special historical status."' Christine Kexel Chabot, Is the Federal Reserve

Constitutional?An OriginalistArgumentfor IndependentAgencies, 96 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 18
(2020) (quoting Seila, 140 S. Ct. at 2202 n.8). Interestingly, Professor Post has noted that Justice
Harlan Fiske Stone, who joined the majority in Myers, had pushed Chief Justice Taft to hold that
the President had "unrestricted removal power of all executive subordinates, superior and inferior,
whether appointed by the president or by the head of a department." Post, supra note 77, at 30.
Professor Post observed that "Taft, as a practical politician, refused even to intimate that the Civil
Service was constitutionally infirm in this way. [As a result,] Taft's argument was thus left curiously

suspended and unsatisfying." Id.
116. See Seila, 140 S. Ct. at 2226-36, 2244-45.
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from that of the executive.' " Second, the presence of four politically appointed
deputies sends a strong message that OLC's primary mission is political rather
Until the Reagan
That is unfortunate and unnecessary.
than legal." 8
administration, the Solicitor General had no political deputies, and even now
there is only one."1 9 There is no need for all but one of the OLC deputies to be
political appointees, and there is little danger that fewer political deputies will
result in a failure to promote the executive's viewpoint within appropriate
bounds. As Trevor Morrison has argued, "the generally pro-executive tenor in
20
OLC's opinions simply reflects that OLC is part of the Executive Branch."1
That will continue whether or not all four deputies are political appointees.
What might not continue are "assertions of executive authority, no matter how
audacious.""' Third, as Bradley Lipton has suggested, the recruitment of more
experienced lawyers to staff OLC would also be helpful. 2 Newly minted,
politically ambitious lawyers are more likely than experienced career lawyers
to be receptive to political suggestion, regardless of how far-fetched an
argument might be necessary to justify the executive's preferred course of
action.'2 3
Serious consideration should also be given to endowing OLC with greater
structural independence by providing the head of OLC with a fixed term
coterminous with that of the President, during which time the head of OLC
could be removed only for cause. Under such a scheme, the head of OLC would
remain someone of the President's choosing, who would presumably share the
President's goals and be committed to the President's policies. Providing the
head of OLC with a fixed term, however, would ensure a modest degree of
institutional independence that would strengthen his or her position if
unreasonable pressures ever were brought to bear. As the Court observed in
117. Many OLC opinions will probably be exempt from mandatory disclosure under
Exemption 5 of the Freedom of Information Act. See, e.g., Campaign for Accountability v. U.S.
Dep't of Justice, 486 F.Supp.3d 424 (D.D.C. 2020). It warrants noting, however, that Freedom of
Information Act exemptions are generally permissive, rather than mandatory. See Chrysler Corp. v.

Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 293 (1979).
118.

See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 20, at 254-55.

119.

See, e.g., Rex E. Lee Conference on the Office of the Solicitor General of the United

States, 2003 BYU L. REV. 1, 44 (2003) (remarks of Andrew L. Frey); id. at 54 (remarks of Michael
McConnell). As Donald Ayer noted, the politically appointed deputy position came about after no
senior member of the Solicitor General's Office was willing to sign the government's brief in a case
in which the Solicitor General was recused. Id. at 87-89 (remarks of Donald Ayer). See Bob Jones

Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 547 (1983); Olatunde C.A. Johnson, The Story of Bob Jones
University v. United States: Race, Religion, and Congress' Extraordinary Acquiescence, in
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION STORIEs 126, 144-48 (William Eskridge et al., eds., 2010).
120.

See Morrison, supranote 20, at 150.

121.

Id.

122.

Lipton, supra note 20, at 255.

123.

See, e.g., Erica Newland, I'm Haunted by What I Did as a Lawyer in the Trump Justice

Department, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/20/opinion/trumpjustice-department-lawyer.html?searchResultPosition=l. The author graduated from Yale Law

School in 2015 and worked at OLC from 2016 to 2018.
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Humphrey's Executor, "one who holds his office only during the pleasure of
another cannot be depended upon to maintain an attitude of independence
against the latter's will." 22 Here, of course, the goal is something far less than
complete independence. The goal is simply to provide the head of OLC with
some measure of security that might strengthen his or her position in the event
that he or she were pressured to give an opinion that was not in accordance with
OLC's "best view of the law." 1 25 Such a scenario may be unlikely to occur in
any event, but granting this limited degree of security of position to the head of
OLC could serve the prophylactic purpose of rendering that possibility even
more remote.
Moreover, removal for cause need not be the anemic remedy that the Court
has recently conceived it to be. In Bowsher v. Synar,126 for example, a key
consideration in the Court's determination that Congress had improperly
retained control over the Comptroller General was the fact that Congress could
remove him for "inefficiency," "neglect of duty," or "malfeasance."127
According to the Bowsher Court, "[t]hese terms are very broad and, as
interpreted by Congress, could sustain removal of a Comptroller General for
28
So
any number of actual or perceived transgressions of the legislative will."
construed, they should provide the President with an appropriate degree of
control over an official of his own choosing, without interfering with the
129
President's duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."
The role of OLC is important but limited. OLC does not directly enforce
any law. Nor does it have the final word concerning any government policy.
Its sole function is to provide legal advice to the executive branch. 3 0 Moreover,
any legal determination that OLC might make is subject to revision by the
Attorney General or the President, and any such determination with which they
might disagree necessarily will give way to their superior authority. Although
the Attorney General does not routinely review the advice given by OLC, that
need not be the case. For these reasons, the head of OLC would qualify as an
"Inferior Officer," and, under Morrison, Congress could structure OLC in a way
that provided the limited degree of independence that we have considered.
Alternatively, the Attorney General could so provide by regulation, as is

124.

Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935).

125.

See ACS Statement on OLC and the Rule of Law, supra note 27, at 8.

126.
127.

478 U.S. 714 (1986).
Id. at 729.

128. Id. The Court further noted that the Constitutional Convention chose to permit
impeachment of executive officers only for "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors." It rejected language that would have permitted impeachment for
"maladministration," with Madison arguing that "[s]o vague a term will be equivalent to a tenure
during pleasure of the Senate." Id. at 729-30.

129. U.S. CONST., art. II, sec. 3.
130. But see Campaign for Accountability v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 486 F. Supp. 3d 424, 43741, 445 (D.D.C. 2020) (noting the possibility that OLC opinions that definitively resolve
interagency disputes may be subject to mandatory disclosure).
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currently the case with the special counsel. 3t There seems, therefore, to be no
legal obstacle to such a reform. That suggests the need for a robust discussion
of the relevant policy arguments.
Finally, it is essential to our form of government that OLC "provid[e]
independent legal advice that offers its attorneys' best view of the law to the
president and executive branch actors." 3 2 That will require certain structural
and other reforms, but, as others have noted, it will also require the development
of a particular institutional ethos and sense of mission within OLC. The
nurturing of that kind of ethos will not be easy because we live in a world in
which there are many mutually reinforcing forces that create strong incentives
simply to "give the lady what she wants."" 3

131. See 28 C.F.R. § 600.1 et seq.; see also U.S. Dep't of Just., Off. of the Att'y Gen.,
Appointment of Special Counsel to Investigate Russian Interference with the 2016 Presidential
Election and Related Matters, Order No. 3915-2017 (May 7, 2017).
132.

See ACS Statement on OLC and the Rule of Law, supra note 27, at 8.

133.

WENDT & KOGAN, supra note

1, at 223.
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